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Antitrust and Consumerism: What
is it all About?
Irving Scher
I. INTRODUCTION
S GEORGE GERSHWIN might have said it, it's very clear
Ar Vthat consumerism is here to stay. President Kennedy's Charter
of Consumer Rights - the rights to be heard, to be informed, to
choose, and to safety - were restated by President Nixon in October
1969 as basic goals of his admin-
istration.1 Not to be outdone
THE AurTHOR: IRVING SCHER (B.A., by two Presidents, the U.S.
College of the City of New York; LL.B.,
Columbia University) is a member of Chamber of Commerce has
the New York Bar and a practicing at- added a fifth right: the right to
torney in New York City. quality and integrity in the mar-
ketplace.2
These proclamations of consumer rights succinctly state the
ideals and objectives of the consumer movement. Concerned with
quality products and product information, the consumer activist de-
mands the widest possible selection of good products at competitive
prices and access to judicial redress if his demands are not met. All
of this is implicitly guaranteed in the espoused rights of a con-
sumer, but consumer spokesmen contend that disparity exists between
the promise and its fulfillment S
The consumer movement has become quite vocal and has made
Editor's note.- This article is based on an address delivered by Mr. Scher at the
Fourth Annual Antitrust Institute of the Ohio Bar Association on May 14, 1970. The
discussion has been updated to include developments occurring on or before November
1, 1970. Since that date the 91st Congress has come to a dose without passage of any
of the bills discussed in the article. However, the author states that the major topics
should reappear early in the 92nd Congress.
1 Message from President Nixon to Congress, 115 CONG. REC. 13,471 (1969).
2 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, BUSiNESS-CONSUME RELA-
TIONS CODE (1970).
3 In an appearance before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Mary Gardiner Jones,
a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, outlined what she considered to be
the major problems of the consumer. She stressed the immediate need for product in-
formation and protection against deceptive practices. She further stressed that con-
sumers urgently need educational programs to protect themselves and to learn what
methods of redress are available. See Hearings on H.R. 14931, H.R. 14585, H.R.
14627, H.R. 14832, H.R. 15066, H.R. 15655, and H. R. 15656 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. oo Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 14931].
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its presence felt nationally. In Washington, D.C., and in state
capitols throughout the country, legislators on both sides of the aisle
are introducing consumer protection measures, and even more can
be expected next year. Businessmen are attending seminars to bring
themselves up-to-date on new regulations and procedures designed
to protect the consumer. Almost everyone is on the bandwagon,
and anybody who criticizes the movement is roundly chastised by
government, consumer spokesmen, and businessmen alike.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
One might ask, what does the subject of consumerism have to
do with antitrust? Actually, quite a bit. Caspar W. Weinberger,
former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has
emphasized the traditional role of antitrust as a bulwark of consumer
protection, stating that the best form of consumer protection is a
strongly competitive economy and an effective antitrust enforcement
policy.4 Senator Philip A. Hart, Chairman of the Senate Antitrust
Subcommittee, has also stressed the importance of traditional anti-
trust concepts to consumerism. He recently estimated that consumers
lose $45 billion yearly because of monopoly pricing, which would
amount to 8 cents of each dollar they spent in 1969.' He asserted
that price-fixing conspiracies have raised consumer prices by 15 to 35
percent.6 He also alleged that during a 10-year period in the State
of Washington alone, consumers overpaid $35 million for bread as a
result of a price-fixing conspiracy, which, if nationwide, would have
totalled $3 billion of consumer overpayment.'
These are problems that application of traditional antitrust law
can remedy. A number of consumers and consumer groups have
pursued the existing antitrust remedies, as many attorneys have
learned who are involved in the antitrust treble damage class actions
which are now pending against drug companies and automobile
manufacturers.8
Certainly, where adequate judicial redress is available to con-
sumers, use is being made of the courts. The 1966 amendment to
4 Address by Caspar W. Weinberger before the ABA Antitrust Section, in ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 457, at A-1 (April 14, 1970).




8 See cases cited notes 25 & 27 infra.
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rule 23' of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 'has greatly facili-
tated consumer treble damage actions under the antitrust laws. Prior
to 1966 there was relatively little consumer antitrust activity"0 apart
from the cases brought by businesses and governmental bodies in
their consumer capacities. This was so despite the fact that in a very
early case the Supreme Court recognized that a purchaser is injured
'in his property" under the antitrust laws when he is led to pay more
for a product than it is worth."
Before the amendment to rule 23, private antitrust suits generally
fell into the category of spurious class actions.'2 Despite such deci-
sions as Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch,"3 wherein the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit established a very liberal precedent for main-
taining antitrust class actions, there were inherent difficulties in-
volved with use of the old rule. The greatest difficulties appear to
have been procedural. In the words of the Advisory Committee
for the new rule, "The original rule did not squarely address itself
to the question of the measures that might be taken during the
course of an action to assure procedural fairness, particularly giving
notice to members of the class. .. ,,14 Another problem was that the
spurious action bound only the joined members; those not wishing
to be bound could remain outside the action.' 5 Moreover, potential
plaintiffs could remain on the periphery of the class and intervene
after the merits had been favorably determined.' 6 Besides these
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
10 ABA SEcrIoN OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTTRusT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968,
at 274 (1968). In the decade preceding 1966, consumer antitrust actions showed a
marked increase, but this increase was small compared to the increased number of anti-
trust actions in other areas.
". Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
12 See Comegys, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under New Rule
23, as Seen by the Treble Damage Defendant, 32 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 271 (1966).
The spurious class action was a permissive joinder device. The character of the rights
sought to be enforced for or against the class were several with a common question
of law or fact affecting the several rights. See 3B J. MOOlE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 9
23.10[1], at 23-2602, 23-2603 (2d ed. 1969). See also note 17 infra & accompanying
text.
13 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952). In that case, the
defendants argued that a spurious class action required not only common questions of
law or fact, but also common relief. Acknowledging that old rule 23(a)(3) did require
"common relief," the court broadly interpreted the phrase to mean "relief emanating
from the same original source." Id. at 743. This liberal interpretation greatly en-
hanced the chance of plaintiffs' qualifying for spurious class actions under the old rule.
14Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 99 (1966).
15See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 280, 284-85 (1950). See also
3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, a 23.12, at 23-2913.
16Unon Carbide & Carbon Co. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
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procedural snarls connected with spurious class actions, courts en-
countered great difficulty in classifying the class actions under the
three categories established in the old rule - true, hybrid, and
spurious.' 7 Confusion abounded, and injustice often went unre-
lieved.'
But the 1966 amendment to rule 23, which came at a time when
the consumer movement was growing, has eliminated many of these
problems. Procedurally, the court must now give members of the
class "the best notice practicable under the circumstances," advising
absent members that they will be bound by the court's determina-
tion unless they request exclusion by a specified date. 19 Substan-
tively, the requirement under the old rule that a class action be true,
hybrid, or spurious, was replaced by specific requirements applicable
to all class actions.20
17 In the true class action the right sought to be enforced was joint, common, or de-
rivative. The hybrid class action was characterized by common questions of fact and
the presence of property which called for distribution or management The spurious
class action involved common questions of law or fact affecting the several rights of the
class members. See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, 5 23.08[1], at 23-2505 to 23-2610.
A classic example of the difficulty which courts had in classifying particular actions
is Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 108 F.2d
51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on remand, 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa.),
rev'd sub nom. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Decker; 123
F.2d 979 (3d Cit. 1941). Five courts heard the case without agreeing as to the proper
category. See Note, Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years of Judicial
Interpretation, 49 BosToN U.L. REv. 682, 684 (1969). As the Note indicates, courts
frequently chose an appropriate category to arrive at a desired result.
18See Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development
of Amended Rule 23,32 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 254 (1966).
'L9 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2). The section provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3) [providing for
class actions where questions of law or fact common to the members pre-
dominate over any questions affecting only individuals], the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through rea-
sonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will ex-
dude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclu-
sion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires,
enter an appearance through his counsel.
See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civl Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1223 (1966),
wherein the author states: "The change in spurious class actions from the old to the new
rules is most significant. The mere fact that an absent member must now take the
initiative to exclude himself ... will result in a much greater range of effectiveness for
class actions."
20 FED. R_ CIV. P. 23(b) adds to the general prerequisites of subdivision (a) [requir-
ing a class so numerous that joinder is impracticable, questions of law or fact common
to the class, common claims and defenses among class members, and protection of the
interests of the class by the representatives] the following requirements for all class ac-
tions:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
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That the provisions of the new rule 23 would facilitate con-
sumer class actions was made clear in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.21
Mr. Eisen alleged a conspiracy to monopolize odd lot trading on the
New York Stock Exchange and to fix the odd lot differential at an
excessive amount. He estimated that there were some 3,750,000
class members. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit de-
dared that his class action under the Sherman Act should not have
been dismissed simply because his individual damages were relative-
ly minute. Indeed, the court went so far as to state that an in-
dividual claimant could be an adequate representative of the huge
class of consumers which would be involved." Another type of con-
sumer class action under new rule 23 and the antitrust laws has in-
volved alleged boycotts by realtors who are said to have refused to
sell houses to Negroes or to have charged excessive prices for homes
sold to Blacks.2 3
However, most of the consumer treble damage actions which
are being brought have followed government prosecutions. There
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
21391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). The Eisen case was remanded and is still being
litigated.
After almost 18 months of additional factfinding, the district court is still unable to
decide the propriety of a class action. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,830 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1970) (order for pretrial confer-
ence to discuss the manageability of and notice to the class).
22The Eisen court took a rather liberal position on the manageability of a class ac-
tion. Other courts are prone to dismiss if the class is exceptionally large. See Hackett
v. General Host Corp., Civil No. 68-558 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1970); Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., Civil No. 2826 (D. Hawaii 1969).
Even if the court finds the action manageable, with fair representation of all con-
cerned parties, plaintiffs must further demonstrate a predominance of common questions
over individual ones and the superiority of a class action over alternative methods.
See Goldman Theatres v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 49 F.R.D. 35 (E.D. Pa.
1969) (a good discussion of the predominant question issue); School Dist. v. Harper &
Row Publishers, 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (action dismissed because individual
questions predominated); Note, supra note 17, at 695-99.
23Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967). See
Baker v. F & F Investment Co., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970).
1970]
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are a number of such treble damage actions pending in the courts,
most of which have been consolidated under the Multidistrict Litiga-
tion Act. 4 Thus, cases have been brought by various private parties
against certain automobile manufacturers charged with conspiring to
delay and obstruct the development and installation of pollution
control devices in motor vehicles. 25  These cases have brought into
the vernacular the term "product fixing,"26 which involves the joint
efforts of manufacturers to limit competition for product quality.
In addition, Justice Department proceedings against antibiotic drug
manufacturers have spawned more than 100 separate consumer ac-
tions, all of which were consolidated in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York 7  Presently, Judge Wyatt has com-
pleted the task of administering a proposed $82 million settlement
program, while conducting trial proceedings in the unsettled cases.2
Thus, the consumer movement has found a home in the federal
courts under the antitrust laws. The current treble damage cases
make it quite evident that, given anticompetitive consumer abuses
and a federal remedy under the antitrust laws, consumers have
learned very well how to protect themselves.2 9 Certainly, one of the
basic antitrust tenets, identical with consumer goals and reflected
in the cases discussed, is that competition and marketing decisions
should be in terms of price, quality, and service. Horizontal price
fixing, bid rigging, and agreements to divide customers and territories
2428 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1969).
25 In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 5
73,317 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970).
2 6 See E. COX, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE
FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssSoN 16-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NADER REPORT].
Product fixing is beginning to replace price fixing as a central method of
avoiding competition. In product fixing, competitors agree to limit the devel-
opment or characteristics of their products in order to increase sales and profits.
The result is planned obsolescence in many products . . . which require the
purchase of a new product or high repair costs. Id.
27 West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
28 See United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970), wherein the
government's action against the drug manufacturers was reversed, causing more prob-
lems for Judge Wyatt.
29 There is a hint of things to come in a recent Yale Law Journal Note, in which the
author suggested that consumer groups could take advantage of the Supreme Court's
decision in Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
There the Court held that tying restrictions requiring a borrower to purchase only the
products of the lender's affiliate constituted per se violations of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). The author of the Note suggests that low in-
come consumers might bring class actions against similar tying arrangements of ghetto
creditors who extend long term credit only if the consumer uses it to buy goods from
ghetto merchants. See Note, Consumers and Antitrust Treble Damages: Credit-Furniture
Tie-ins in the Low Income Market, 79 YALE L.J. 254 (1969).
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are declared unlawful because they deprive customers of the ability
to make buying choices based on price, quality, and service. 0 In
the automobile pollution case, the manufacturers were proceeded
against because they allegedly colluded to hold back the development
of better products.3 ' Tie-in arrangements are struck down because
buyers are forced to purchase merchandise for reasons other than
price, quality, or service." Reciprocal dealing arrangements are at-
tacked because the supplier who utilizes the potential volume of his
purchases in order to promote the reciprocal sale of his own products
deprives his competitors of sales they might otherwise have made
on the basis of price, quality, or service.33
Although many of the consumer demands relating to free, com-
petitive markets thus find adequate remedies under the existing anti-
trust laws, not all business activities which are antithetical to con-
sumer and antitrust goals rise to the level of antitrust violations,
or at least they have not yet been considered such.84 Antitrust legis-
lation was formulated under the assumption that consumer protec-
tion is best served by free competition 5 - by keeping the channels
of commerce unclogged the consumer should have a wide selection
of quality products at reasonable prices. Similarly, a significant,
if generally unarticulated, premise of the consumer movement is
the need to channel business energies into types of competition that
have a relationship to price, quality, and service. Yet consumer activ-
ists contend that the prohibitions of the antitrust laws alone do not
guarantee this type of competition. They point out that today con-
sumer competence is just as essential to the attainment of free
competition as is the removal of trade restraints. They stress that
it is the competent consumer who is able to make rational choices
among competitive products and that consumer competence is di-
minished where purchasers are not provided with adequate and ac-
curate information necessary to make buying decisions based on pure
30 See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
31 In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 5
73,317 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970).
32 See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC,
381 U.S. 357 (1964).
33 See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
34 See text accompanying notes 38-46 infra.
35 See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
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quality and service. 86 Consumer spokesmen further contend that the
absence of such information leaves the consumer at the mercy of
those marketing practices which play on his vanity and ignorance.37
Consumer spokesmen claim there has been a breakdown in the
traditional competitive processes in that competition in price, quality,
and service is being avoided by the simple device of not giving con-
sumers sufficient information on which to base decisions as to the
best buy. For example, suppliers are directing their consumer prod-
uct advertising to irrational or irrelevant qualities.31 Instead of re-
ceiving information concerning price, performance, quality, safety,
and service, the public is being told to buy products because they
will make the consumer more glamorous, prosperous, or desirable.
Consumer activists claim they are being given pretty packages, the
varying sizes and shapes of which proliferate daily, but they are not
being told what is in the package and what makes it a better buy
than a competitor's product. It is argued that the consumer wants
hard facts about the products and services being offered to him, but
too often he is not getting them.
It is because consumer advocates claim that purchasers are not
getting facts about how long an appliance should give service and
the type of assistance which will be rendered if the product breaks
down, that there have been outcries for strong guarantee legisla-
tion.38 Because it is claimed that the consumer is not being suffi-
3 6 See Barnes, Considerations Concerning A Public Policy Toward Administered
Prices, in SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG. 1ST SESS., ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON
PUBLIC POLICY 44 (Comm. Print 1963). In this essay, Professor Barnes emphasized
the importance of consumer competence within a competitive economy and warned of
the dangers of inadequate product information:
Consumer competence in choosing rationally and accurately among compet-
ing products is the very foundation of an efficient competitive economy. Any
development which impairs the capacity of consumers to make rational choices,
to compare competitive products accurately, to recognize genuine differences in
price, and in short, to make the choice which is right in light of all relevant
considerations, must have the effect of impairing the capacity of markets to
perform their functions. Only where the consumer choices are made compe-
tently can sales in the market place give preference to more competent and
efficient producers and serve as an effective allocator of resources to their most
efficient uses.
Consumer competence is impaired whenever consumers lack adequate infor-
mation and understanding to make intelligent choices among inscrutable prod-
ucts.... Increasingly, the effort is made to substitute emotional attachment
to the familiar brand for intelligent comparison of competing products, so
that the buyer responds to the rationale of sales promotion rather than an
objective calculus of prices and utilities. Id. at 67.
37 Id.
3 8 See NADER REPORT, supra note 26, at 18-19.
39 See S. 3074, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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ciently told how to care for products he buys, the Federal Trade
Commission has proposed that permanent care labeling information
should be required of textile and garment manufacturers. 40  It is
because many toiletry and grocery product manufacturers have
chosen not to package their products in a manner that would facili-
tate consumer price-quality comparisons, that there was first an out-
cry for truth in packaging legislation and currently there are further
demands for unit pricing legislation.41 And it was because creditors
chose not to advise the consumer dearly about the actual cost of
consumer credit, that the Truth in Lending Act42 was enacted to as-
sist the consumer in determining credit values.
Consumer demands for more vigorous competition in terms of
price, quality, and service, and for the information on which to base
decisions as to the best buy, are becoming more articulate and
stronger each day. Although the agencies and legislatures may
now be responding, consumer advocates claim that business is simply
not listening. Ralph Nader recently told an audience of retailers
that consumer product manufacturers are using advertising appeals
to reduce quality and price competition. He declared that "compe-
tition is so rare today as to constitute a deviation from the norm. ' 43
He stressed that producers of breakfast foods are concentrating so
hard on packaging and "the smile on the animal's face," that little
attention is given to "what's inside the package. 44
There are indications that in certain oligopolistic consumer prod-
ucts industries, emphasis on noncompetitive advertising appeals
rather than price and quality competition may be resulting in higher
consumer prices and greater market concentration. On April 29,
1970, Senator William Proxmire wrote to the Federal Trade Com-
mission urging an investigation of consumer products industries in
which not more than four firms control 50 percent of the sales.45
The following week the FTC issued a report based on a study of
the food industry, in which it was concluded that industry profit
rates are significantly higher in food manufacturing industries where
40 See Proposed FTC Trade Reg. Rules on Care Labeling of Textile Products, 34
Fed. Reg. 17,776 (1969).
4 1 SeeH.R. 11549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
42 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-41, 1661-65 (Supp. IV, 1969). The Act is Title
I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tits. I-V, 82 Stat. 144
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). Truth in Lending went into effect on
July 1, 1969.
43 N.Y. Times, May 12, 1970, at 57, coL 7.
44Id.
4 5 Washington Post, May 4, 1970, at 2, cols. 1-2.
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the top four firms account for more than 40 percent of total ship-
ments, and particularly when significant advertising barriers to entry
exist.46 Thus, we may soon see antitrust enforcement activities
involving concentrated consumer products industries where it is
claimed that "soft" competition through advertising and selling tech-
niques which do not relate to price, quality or service has led to
excessive profits and barriers to entry.
However, because many of these activities which deprive the con-
sumer of adequate and useful product information have not yet been
recognized as antitrust violations, the courts are generally not avail-
able to consumers with respect to such practices. It is here that con-
sumers have turned to the regulatory agencies and, to a greater ex-
tent, to the legislatures for protection and redress.
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION BY THE FTC
Although consumerism may appear to be a recent development,
the consumer has had an established spokesman in the FTC. For
many years the mission of the FTC has been to control the myriad of
marketing practices that prevent the consumer from efficiently fulfill-
ing his vital role in a competitive economy. Created by statute in
1914, 7 the FTC was envisioned as an agency for dealing primarily
with antitrust problems.4 8 But with the passage of the Wheeler-Lea
Act" in 1938, prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," the
Commission received a congressional mandate to protect the con-
sumer and his function in the marketplace. For the last three dec-
ades, the Commission's major function has been to define precisely
what practices are unfair and deceptive and then to prohibit their
recurrence. Many of today's consumer advocates are claiming, how-
ever, that the FTC has been inexcusably lax in looking out for con-
sumer interests. They have lost faith in the willingness and the ability
of the Commission to proceed on their behalf, particularly in difficult
cases against large, national manufacturers.50 Recently, a group of
46 See FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INFLUENCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON
PROFIT PERFORMANCE OF FOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANIES, summarized in 3
TRADE REG. REP. 5 10,378 (FTC Release May 5, 1970).
47 Federal Trade Commission Act §1, ch. 311, §1, 38 Star. 717 (1914), as amended
15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
4 8 NADER REPORT, supra note 26, at 215; cf. Macntyre & von Brand, Unfair Meth-
ods of Competitition as an Evolving Concept - Prelude to Consumerism, 44 ST. JOHN'S
L REV. 597, 609-10 (1970). See also Raladam Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.
1930), afl'd, 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
49 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), amending ch. 311,
§ 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
50 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 15440 & S. 985 Before the House Comm. on Inter-
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"Nader's Raiders" published a devastating critique of the FTC's
past policies and practices. According to their report, the Commis-
sion 'has failed to detect violations systematically," "has failed to
establish efficient priorities for its enforcement energy," "has failed
to enforce the powers it has with energy and speed," and "has
failed to seek sufficient statutory authority to make its work effec-
tive."6 1 Also critical of the agency's past performance is the recent
report issued by a committee of the American Bar Association.5" It
concluded that the Commission's past consumer protection efforts
have been ineffective, lacking a unified approach based on policy
planning, and that the ETC has provided insufficient leadership to
state and local authorities. 3
That these charges may be true is unfortunate, for a vigorous
consumer protection program might have obviated some of the re-
cently enacted consumer legislation and could have rendered unnec-
essary many of the current demands for more legislation relating to
the control of marketing practices. For example, there is little ques-
tion that the Commission can insist that suppliers disclose product
information when its absence could deceive purchasers5 4 It is argu-
able that this authority for ordering the disclosure of material facts
where their absence would be deceptive could have supported rul-
ings requiring the disclosure of more adequate product information
in general, thereby facilitating the consumer's function in the mar-
ketplace.55 In addition, the FTC had previously ordered a more
complete disclosure of credit terms in commercial transactions. 56
But it took the enactment of the Truth in Lending Act6 7 for the
Commission to more actively assist the consumer in obtaining ade-
quate credit information. Under that Act, the FTC is directed to
enforce provisions requiring creditors to disclose the annual per-
centage rate of finance charges payable by the consumer.58
state and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 15440).
51NADER REPORT, supra note 26, at 39.
WR PORT oF T ABA COMMISSiON TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMIas-
SION (1969).
631d. at 37-39.
54See 3. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967); Ward Labs., Inc.
v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960).
55 See MacIntyre & von Brand, supra note 48, at 616.
6 See Leon A. Tashof, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,606
(FTC 1968).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-41, 1661-65 (Supp. IV, 1969).
581d. § 1607(c).
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Similarly, the Commission had previously proceeded under the
authority of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA)"9 against deceptive packaging practices, such as those in-
volving "slack filled" packages.60 However, Congress concluded
that the language of section 5 as construed by the FTC was too im-
precise to require that product information be sufficient to aid the
consumer in making rational buying choices in terms of price and
quantity."' Because of this finding, the Fair Packaging and Label-
ing Act"' was passed in 1966. At its core are two important pro-
visions. Section 4 outlines specific rules for labeling and for the
placement, form, and contents of a statement of quantity. 3 And
section 5 explicitly directs the FTC to promulgate regulations di-
rected against practices that either deceive consumers, such as slack
filling, or impair the consumer's ability to make value comparisons
among products." Activities in violation of these regulations and
the mandatory provisions of the Act are automatically deemed "un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices," and the FTC is authorized to
proceed against them under its traditional authority in section 5 of
the FTCA. 65
As another example of the FTC's failure to act, it is arguable
that the Commission could have proceeded more actively against
misleading product warranties. Vigorous enforcement might have
effectively discouraged suppliers from representing in their guaran-
tees that they could adequately service products when in fact they
could not. By the same token, the Commission could have stopped
the inclusion of fine print disclaimers where the advertising and the
express warranty statements deceptively proclaim virtually unlim-
59 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
60 See, e.g., The Papercraft Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
5 16,721 (FTC 1964). "Slack filling" involves the use of oversized containers to create
a false and misleading impression of the quantities contained therein. Id. at 21,652.
61S. REP. No. 1186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See also Hearings on H.R.
15440, supra note 50, at 39, 40.
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. IV, 1969). The statute's declaration of policy
clearly reflects the need for more product information:
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a
free economy. Packages and their labels should enable the consumers to ob-
tain accurate information as to the quantity of the contents and should facili-
tate value comparisons. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Congress to assist consumers and manufacturers in reaching these goals in the
marketing of consumer goods. Id. § 1451.
631d. § 1453.
64 Id. § 1454.
65 Id. § 1456.
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ited warranty protection.66 But as a result of FTC inaction, these
practices are now the subject of a guarantee bill which has passed
the Senate.67
Perhaps in response to the criticism and the recent legislation,
the FTC has now embarked upon a strong consumer protection cam-
paign, reflected not only in the change of its bureaucratic structure
but also in its recent rulings. A Consumer Protection Bureau was
established in June 1970, under a reorganization plan designed to
streamline the operations of the Commission.6 8  Substantively, recent
Commission complaints, cease and desist orders, and industry pro-
ceedings are creating important new precedents under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act in areas where both federal and
state legislative demands are being made. Thus, the Commission
has required door-to-door salesmen, found to have engaged in high-
pressured, deceptive trade practices, to provide a 3-day "cooling off"
period in their contracts, during which time consumers will be free
to rescind such contracts. 9 Similar rescission periods are proposed
in current federal and state bills.7 °
In another area, the Commission has prohibited suppliers from
making unfair use of the holder in due course doctrine. Under this
technique, retailers would execute a negotiable instrument in con-
nection with a consumer sale and then assign it to a finance company
which is immune to consumer claims.71  Because consumers may
be unaware that the assignment of a negotiable instrument affects
6 6 FTC Guides Against Deceptive Advertising of Guarantees, 16 C.P.R. § 239.0-.7
(1970).
67 See text accompanying notes 127-38 infra.
68 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 9555, at 16,038 (FTC Release June 3, 1970). See also
Weinberger, The Federal Trade Commission: Progress and a New Profile, 22 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 5, 7-8 (1970), (supra in this issue).
G9 Household Sewing Mach. Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
9 18,882 (FTC 1969). See Proposed FTC Trade Reg. Rules on Cooling Off Period for
Door-to-Door Sales, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,164 (1970). For a list of states in which this cool-
ing off period is already required by law, see Household Sewing Mach. Co., supra, at
21,218, n.33.
7 0 See, e.g., H.R. 10923, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 4342, Fla. 1st Legis., 2d
Reg. Sess. (1970); S. 1735, Mich. 75th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1970).
7 1 See Thermachemical Prods., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 5 18,862 (FTC 1969), where the assignee was merely a shell corporation for the
purpose of collecting on the defaulted notes. The assignee corporation issued no stock,
held no meetings, elected no directors, and only had one officer, whose "offices" were
closely connected with the respondent's. The Commission skirted the issue of whether
the assignee would be a holder in due course under applicable state law by stating that
it was concerned only with the question of whether the assignee's representation that
it was a holder in due course was an unfair practice. Id. at 21,200-01. See also All-
State Indus., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. g 18,740 (FTC
1969), affirmed, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970).
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their rights against the seller and the assignee, the Commission found
that the failure to inform purchasers of this fact constitutes an un-
fair trade practice.7
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently upheld an
FTC order requiring a company to disclose to consumers that they
are under no obligation to return or care for unsolicited merchandise
and that payment is required only if the consumer decides to purchase
the merchandise.73 Legislation has also been proposed in this area."
In a recent case, the Commission has included in a proposed con-
sent order a requirement that a company must not withhold prize
money from consumers who had returned contest entries containing
at least one correct answer to each question."" The respondent had
awarded too few prizes, the Commission claimed, because of an un-
disclosed rule which required contestants to include more than one
correct answer to certain questions. The proposed order apparently
demonstrates the Commission's efforts to expand its remedial powers
to include consumer restitution.
In a number of proposed Industry Guides and Trade Regula-
tion Rules, the Commission is seeking to require advertising and
labeling information concerning the properties and performance of
products,7" and any limitations on the availability of sale merchan-
7 2 1n All-State Indus., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADER ERG. REP.
18,740 (FTC 1969), the Commission noted:
If the instrument executed in connection with the purchase is negotiated to a
holder in due course, the buyer may be indebted to the assignee notwith-
standing any defense or claim the buyer may have against the seller on the
original contract such as non-delivery or defects in the purchased merchandise
(see the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-305, now adopted in most states).
In this circumstance, we find it palpably unfair for a seller who routinely as-
signs instruments ... to fail to disclose ... that such transfer is contemplated
and may result in substantial alteration of the buyer's rights and liabilities.
Id. at 21,105-06.
73 Eastwood v. FTC, 418 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1969). See The FTC Gets Tough,
TIME, Oct. 19, 1970, at 80, for a survey of the FTC's most recent consumer protection
actions against soft drink, suntan lotion, and light bulb manufacturers, from which
the FTC, under Chairman Miles Kirkpatrick, is demanding more accurate product in-
formation. A proposed FTC order would also require that contest advertisers fully
disclose the odds against an entrant's winning. Id.
74 See, e.g., S. 2, Ohio 108th Gen. Ass'y (1970).
75 Coca Cola Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,290 (FTC July 1, 1970). See also
Curtis Publishing Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,798
(FTC 1969) (The proposed order would require a publisher to offer cash refunds for
the unexpired portions of subscriptions to a magazine that ceased publication.); The
FTC Gets Tough, supra note 73. But see Curtis Publishing Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
5 19,376 (FTC Oct. 23, 1970) (hearing examiner found that the FTC lacks jurisdic-
tion to order monetary restitution).
76See, e.g., Proposed FTC Trade Reg. Rules on Care Labeling of Textile Products,
34 Fed. Reg. 17,776 (1969); Proposed FTC Trade Reg. Rules on Incandescent Electric
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dise.77  In addition, there are proposed guides for including with
the sale of certain products implied warranties of fitness and mer-
chantability.78  All of this is covered in bills under current study.79
Through cooperative efforts between its field offices and local
officials in 11 key cities, the Commission is now embarking on an at-
tack against localized abuses.80 It will lend its expertise to state and
local officials by recommending the appropriate actions which need
to be taken against frauds at the local level. Where local laws are
inadequate, the Commission will assist local officials in securing new
legislation.
The Commission's efforts to effectuate greater consumer protec-
tion under the existing authority of section 5 of the FTGA has not,
however, quelled the pervading dissatisfaction over its past policies
and enforcement practices. For the many consumer spokesmen who
have already lost faith in the Commission, its recent actions are
still too little, or they have come too late. Moreover, some believe
that the Commission's basic enforcement tool - the cease and desist
order"1 - is more of a handicap than a help to the consumer, since
it is issued only after laborious, time-consuming proceedings. Lit-
erally years pass between the filing of a complaint and the issuance
of a final decree."2 Additionally, the cease and desist order is pro-
spective only, imposing no sanctions for past abuses and those oc-
curring during the proceedings. Others blame the Commission for
using its enforcement tools too meekly. This was evidenced when a
group of students attempted to intervene in a false advertising pro-
ceeding against a soup company. Their purpose in intervening was
to demand that the Commission's decree include an order requiring
the company to state clearly in all future advertising that the Com-
mission had proceeded against it.88
Light Bulbs, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,528 (1969); Proposed FTC Trade Reg. Rules on Gasoline
Octane Ratings, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,449 (1969).
7 7 See Proposed FTC Trade Reg. Rules on Retail Food Store Advertising and Market-
ing Practices, 34 Fed. Reg. 18,252 (1969).
7 8 See Proposed 'FTC Guides for Advertising Over-the-Counter Drugs, 34 Fed. Reg.
5387 (1969); Proposed FTC Guides for the Household Furniture Industry, 34 Fed. Reg.
2998 (1970).
7 9 See S. 3074, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969); H.R. 16634, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); ELR. 16638, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
8 0 See 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 50,274, at 55,604 (FTC Release Feb. 5, 1970).
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
82 See note 108 infra.
8 3 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,261
(FTC May 25, 1970). The FTC, however, found that the intervenors' petition did not
raise sufficient issues of either law or fact to require further actions in the form of a
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IV. PROPOSED CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION
Amid their discontent over FTC shortcomings and the absence
of adequate private remedies under the antitrust laws, consumer
spokesmen are pressing for legislative reforms and directives, de-
signed to enhance governmental protection of the consumer. For
instance, many are calling for the establishment of a new agency,
totally independent of the FTC and charged with the responsibility
of acting solely on behalf of the consumer. Three bills now pend-
ing in Congress outline a diversity of structures and powers which
such a new agency might assume. One proposal would create an
Independent Consumer Council, a nongovernmental corporation
free from direct political controls.s4 Another measure would estab-
lish a new cabinet post, the Department of Consumer Affairs."5 A
third bill would provide for both an Office of Consumer Affairs
within the Executive Office of the President and a Consumer Protec-
tion Division within the Department of Justice. 6
Notwithstanding the differences in bureaucratic structures, the
respective offices have in common a threefold role. First, they
would be authorized to appear before judicial and regulatory pro-
ceedings on behalf of consumer interests.17  Second, the new offices
would all act as clearinghouses for complaints concerning commer-
cial trade practices.8 8 The complaints would be referred to the
hearing. In addition, the FTC felt that its cease and desist order would sufficiently
serve the public interest, and therefore there was no need for the affirmative disclosure.
Id. at 21,422-23. The Commission has since included provisions in proposed cease
and desist orders which would require advertisers to make such public disclosures for
I year. See Standard Oil Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,352 (FTC Sept 29, 1970); Coca
Cola Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,351 (FTC Sept. 29, 1970).
84 S. 2959, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
85 S. 860, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 6037, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). One
provision in these identical bills would even transfer to the new cabinet department
authority originally vested in the FTC by the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1451, 1454, 1456 (Supp. IV, 1969). S. 860, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a)(1); -. R.
6037, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a)(1) (1969).
86 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 14758, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
See also H.R. 13793, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
87 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1969); H.R. 14758, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 202 (1969); S. 2959, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1969); S. 860, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7 (1969); H.R. 6037, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1969). This is in answer to criticism
that most information presented at these proceedings has been compiled by producers
and manufacturers and is therefore not entirely objective. See Hearings on H.R. 7179
Before the Executive and Legislative Reorganization Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93, 152-53 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 7179].
88 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1969); H.R. 14758, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §
104 (1969); S. 2959, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1969); S. 860, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 8 (1969); H.R. 6037, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1969). These provisions are in
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agency whose regulatory authority provided the most effective reme-
dies for the problem. Finally, the proposed bodies would be di-
rected to develop wide-ranging programs for the collection and
dissemination of helpful product information to the consumer.89
There seems to be little opposition to the basic idea of establish-
ing some type of federal agency for coordinating the wide spectrum
of national and state consumer programs and advising the President,
the Congress, and the various administrative bodies about effective
consumer protection policies. Beyond that, however, the proposals
have been the subject of political controversy. Recent congres-
sional hearings have highlighted fundamental disagreements among
congressional and administrative officials over the allocation of en-
forcement powers to a new consumer office, and over the right of this
new office to intervene on behalf of consumers in judicial and
regulatory proceedings. As an example, the Administration's pro-
posal, 0 creating an Office of Consumer Affairs within the Executive
Office and a Consumer Protection Division within the Justice De-
partment, has been criticized for assigning enforcement powers to an
already overburdened department,91 and for giving it the final say on
whether or not to intervene for the consumer, rather than allowing
the consumer office to make a final determination.92  In addition,
the hearings have revealed the Administration's concern over the
extent to which the federal government should become involved
in product testing. 3
response to complaints that the multiplicity of government agencies has made it almost
impossible for the average consumer to determine what body has jurisdiction over his
particular problem. See Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 87, at 160, 164-65.
89 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(b)(7) (1969); H.R. 14758, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 103(b)(7) (1969); S. 2959, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1969); S. 860, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. § 9 (1969); H.L 6037, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1969).
80 HLR. 14 758,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
9 1 Hearings on H.R. 6037 & Related Bills Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Gov't Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on H.R. 6037]. The alternative proposals to establish a Department of Consumer
Affairs, MIL 6037, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) and S. 860, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969),
may result in some jurisdictional problems if some of the powers and dudes of the FTC
and the Food and Drug Administration are transferred to the new department. See
Forte, The Department of Consumers, 20 VAND. L. REV. 969 (1967), in which the
author discusses previous bills to create a separate consumer department at the cabinet
level.
92 Hearings on H.R. 6037, supra note 91, at 217-18. For further criticism of a
proposed Office of Consumer Affairs within the Executive Office, see Hearings on S.
860 & S. 2045 Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reo-rganization of the Senate Comm.
on Gov't Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 713-724 (1969).
93 Hearings on H.R. 6037, supra note 91, at 212,222,250.
Both the Senate and the House Government Operations Committees have reported
out the consumer agency bills, which may reach the floor of both houses during the 1970
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Notwithstanding the continuing, albeit necessary, reliance on
the various branches of the national government to protect consumer
interests, many consumer advocates believe that the Government
remains lax and that its limited resources preclude detection and
prevention of all consumer frauds which occur in the marketplace.94
In the face of such laxity on the part of the Government, consumer
spokesmen are demanding that the public be given more direct ave-
nues of legal redress. Of the congressional proposals which would
bestow new private rights of action, the consumer class action bills9"
are certainly the most far-reaching and the most controversial.
A discussion of the relative merits of the various class action
proposals must be prefaced with a brief survey of the relevant statu-
tory and decisional law. At present, the federal courts afford con-
sumers only restricted access to direct relief against the merchants
of fraud and deceit. This is because federal courts have limited
jurisdiction, which is restricted to those consumer suits which either
arise under federal law or are between parties of diverse citizen-
ship. 6 Because there is no federal substantive law today authoriz-
ing private suits against unfair consumer practices which do not con-
stitute antitrust violations, the "arising under" requirement cannot
be satisfied for most consumer grievances. 7 Unlike the antitrust
laws,9 8 section 5 of the FTCA99 does not create a private cause of ac-
tion for consumers.
But while the doors of the federal courts might remain dosed
to private actions by defrauded or deceived consumers who lack a
federal claim, they may be opened where the parties to the action
are citizens of different states. Consumers encounter substantial
obstacles, however, in establishing diversity jurisdiction. First, many
consumer abuses are committed at the local level by suppliers who
are citizens of the injured consumer's home state.100 And even if
diversity of citizenship can be established, consumers encounter a
post-election session. See H.R. REP. No. 1361, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP.
No. 1331, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
9 4 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 14931, supra note 3, at 15, 44; Hearings on S. 1980
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1969).
95 See bills listed in note 104 infra.
9 6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964), which gives district courts original jurisdiction
over suits "arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade
and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
98 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
99 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
100 Hearings on H.R. 14931, supra note 3, at 42.
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second obstacle - the requirement that the amount in controversy ex-
ceed $10,000.101 The great majority of individual consumers suffer
losses which are below the jurisdictional minimum. 102 Moreover, in
Snyder v. Harris,'"° the Supreme Court recently ruled that plaintiffs
in a class action suit brought under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure could not aggregate their individual claims in order
to reach the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum. The effect of this
decision was to put private redress in federal courts well beyond the
reach of most consumers.
Thus, for those who apparently believe that federal courts are a
proper forum for dealing with local consumer fraud and deception,
it is understandable why considerable pressure is being brought to
bear on Congress to facilitate consumer access to those courts.
Many consumer advocates find that the proposed class action bills
offer the greatest promise of opening the federal courts to all in-
jured consumers.
At present nearly one dozen class action bills are pending in
Congress. 0 4 Many are carbon copies of one another, and so far only
one of these bills, S. 3201,105 has been reported out of committee.
As first proposed by the Administration, S. 3201 would have permit-
ted private suits, including class actions, against suppliers who know-
ingly engage in any of 11 specified unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices. These practices include many of those which have been de-
termined unfair trade practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. This bill, however, would have permitted a con-
sumer action only after the Government has successfully enjoined,
or secured a consent decree against, the trade violation. 06 This need
101 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
102 Hearings op H.R. 14931, supra note 3, at 44.
103 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
104 H.R. 18764, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 15656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); H.R. 15655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 15543, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); H.R. 15066, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); H.R 14832, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 14627, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); H.R. 14585, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 1980,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
105 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. 3201). Introduced and re-
ferred to the Committee on Commerce on December 3, 1969, it was reported out on
August 14, 1970, in a completely amended version, S. 3201, Commerce Comm. Print,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. 3201, Commerce Comm. Print).
See S. REP. No. 1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) thereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
1124). Because of its effect on the federal courts, the amended bill was referred, in an
unusual maneuver, to the Committee on the judiciary for further consideration. See text
accompanying notes 117-19 infra.
106 S. 3201, supra note 105, § 204. Aside from the FTC's traditional cease and
desist orders, this bill as originally proposed would have given the FTC and the At-
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for a government decree as a prerequisite to direct consumer redress
has been described as a "triggering device.'1 07  It has been the focal
point of much of the criticism against the Administration's bill.
For example, one witness feared that an undue amount of time
would elapse between a violation and the satisfactory completion of
a government suit. 08  It was argued by consumer advocates that
during the time it takes the government bureaucracy to make a de-
cision, file suit, and secure compliance, a supplier or manufacturer
could effectively dissipate its assets. A suit by a consumer would then
be futile.
As an alternative to the Administration's rather restrictive pro-
posal, Senator Tydings and Representative Eckhardt introduced what
were described as "wide open" bills. These bills, S. 3092109 and
H.R. 14585,110 would permit immediate consumer action in federal
courts with respect to any practices violating section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act or any other federal or state law for the
benefit of consumers. Thus, these bills would permit virtually un-
restrained consumer class actions in the federal courts, regardless
of the amount in controversy.
Most of the testimony by business interests has been in total
opposition to any type of federal consumer class action statute. It
has been claimed that class action suits do not provide for the swift
and efficient resolution of consumer claims, but instead are cumber-
some and time-consuming."' Reference has been made to the great
administrative burden that any class action places upon a court, and
it has been predicted that consumer actions against any and all un-
fair trade practices would completely swamp the federal courts."
Between the Administration's bill and the Tydings-Eckhardt pro-
posal, it has been argued that the latter poses a greater threat to
business interests. In essence, it is argued that a statute granting
torney General authority to seek injunctive relief against unfair trade practices. Id.
§ 203.
107 See Hearings on H.R. 14931, supra note 3, at 230-31.
108 Id. It was noted during the hearings that an average of 5 years elapses between
the receipt of a complaint by the FTC and the issuance of the cease and desist order.
Id. at 176.
109 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
110 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
111 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2246, S. 3092 & S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., set. 48, pt. 2, at 256-61, 388,
498-501 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 32011; Hearings on H.R. 14931,
supra note 3, at 262-63.
112 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3201, supra note 111, at 297-99, 501; Hearings on H.R.
14931, supra note 3, at 342.
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consumers unrestricted private remedies would be subject to rampant
abuse. Plaintiffs would supposedly be uninterested in suing the
"fly-by-night" operators who exploit consumers, but who may be
judgment proof against substantial awards.' Rather, it is claimed
that the class action remedy would be used to harass legitimate busi-
ness enterprises. For example, these enterprises may be forced to de-
fend claims which involve insignificant, technical, or isolated adver-
tising violations that do not cause significant harm to the consumer." 4
To prevent such harassment, the Administration inserted in its bill a
"triggering mechanism" and a list of specific violations. Under that
bill, a consumer class action would not be permitted until a govern-
ment agency had first decided that a particular practice is harmful
enough to merit government intervention.
As noted above, consumer advocates have argued against predi-
cating direct redress on government enforcement, claiming that the
latter has been sporadic and untrustworthy to date and should not
be expected to improve in the future. Their arguments have appar-
ently been persuasive to the Senate Commerce Committee. In re-
porting out the Administration's bill, S. 3201, that Committee
amended it so that the "trigger mechanism" would not be required
when an unfair trade practice results in a "substantial" injury to the
consumer; 1 5 as implied by the proposed statute, a consumer incurs
a substantial loss if he pays or becomes obligated to pay more than
$10 as a result of such practice.: 6 In other words, those consumers
whose individual claims are greater than $10 would be able to file
a class action regardless of whether the government sues or not.
It is as yet unclear whether S. 3201 as amended or any other
consumer class action bill will be enacted by the 91st Congress.
Although S. 3201 was reported out by the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee, it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
which conducted hearings on the bill." 7  Most of the witnesses at
the hearings were firmly opposed to its allowing essentially unlimited
class actions."8  On October 5, 1970, the bill was reported out by
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary without recommendation."'
13 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3201,supra note 111, at 311,453,506.
114 Cf. Hearings on H.R. 14931, supra note 3, at 282.
115 S. REP. No. 1124,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1970).
116 See S. 3201, Commerce Comm. Print, sapra note 105, § 206(b).
17 See 116 CONG. REc. S13,457 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1970).
118 See, e.g., Statement on S. 3201 by Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Aug. 27, 1970.
119 116 Cong. Rec. S17,085 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1970).
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Consumers' efforts to obtain legislative redress against unfair
trade practices have not stopped at demands for the right to appear
before government agencies and the right to sue on their own behalf.
There is also a growing demand for legislation intended to require
suppliers to compete more in terms of price, quality, and service.
Some bills would require disclosure of what consumer activists con-
sider to be relevant facts for making the best buy. Other proposals
are directed at making specific products safer, and still others are
aimed at controlling specific market practices. Specifically, the sub-
ject matter ranges from measures requiring the federal inspection
of motor vehicles,120 the recalling of defective tires, 2' and the dis-
closure of gasoline specifications' 22 to bills which would provide for
licensing of auto mechanics, 123 governmentally endorsed testing stan-
dards and product specifications,'124 unit pricing of packaged con-
sumer commodities,'125 and the right to rescind high-pressured door-
to-door sales. 26
The proposal which appears to have the most chance for success
this year is the Moss-Magnuson Guaranty Bill. 2 ' It offers protec-
tion to the consumers against manufacturers who have provided
misleading warranties containing incomplete or deceptive informa-
tion. Suppliers would be required to make dear and conspicuous
disclosure of the warranty terms and include instructions on what to
do if the product becomes defective..'2  In this way, a consumer
would gain a better understanding of the metes and bounds of the
various warranties. Assuming that buyers will in part base their
purchasing decisions on the type of warranty being offered, the
proposed legislation could help answer part of the consumer demand
that competition be based on price, quality, and service. 29 In addi-
120 H.R. 15262, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
121 S. 1957,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
122 H.R. 6491, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
123 H.R. 8161, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
124 S. 3286, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 15229, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
125 S. 3752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 11549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1424,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
126 H.R. 9289, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). For an example of the FTC's belated
action in this area, see text accompanying note 69 supra.
127 S. 3074, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
128 Id. § 3(a).
129 See S. REP. No. 876, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970), in which the Senate
Commerce Committee concluded:
Only when the rules of the warranty game are clarified so that the consumer
can look to the warranty duration of a guaranteed product as an indicator of
product reliability will consumers be able to differentiate between reliable and
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tion to the above requirements, the bill would require that only
guarantees which provide for full parts and services in the event
of defects or malfunctions may be labeled as "full" guarantees;1 0
all other guarantees must be dearly labeled as "partial" guarantees.181
The bill would also do away with disclaimers of implied warranties
where an express warranty is given to the consumer.18 2
To implement this legislation, the FTC would be given broad
rulemaking authority to regulate the manner in which manufacturers
are to inform consumers of the terms and conditions of their guaran-
tees.188 Those who fail to comply with the regulations promulgated
by the FTC or with the specific requirements of the bill face no less
than three suits. Two are government actions: the FTC may issue
cease and desist orders, and the Attorney General may seek injunc-
tive relief in a federal distict court. 84  More significantly, con-
sumers may bring private actions in any state or federal court. 85
The latter provision has caused a great deal of debate. As presently
drafted, the bill would require consumer actions in federal court
to meet the jurisdictional requirements of section 1331 of the Judi-
cial Code."" However, under the alternative of bringing actions
in state courts, the jurisdictional obstacles would be less formidable
in those states having liberal class action rules.'87
The Moss-Magnuson bill has passed the Senate' 38 and is presently
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
where hearings have been held. Although there could be consider-
less reliable products with the result that economic rewards from increased
sales and reduced service costs will accrue to the producer of more reliable
products.
180 S. 3074, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1970).
18id. § 4(a)(2).
182 Id. § 9(a). The term of the implied warranty, however, could be limited to the
period of an express warranty. Id. § 9(b).
133Id. §§ 3(b), 5(d)(2), 10.
134Id. §§ 11(b)-(c) (1).
135Id. § 11(e).
186 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964), which provides in part:
The federal district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclu-
sive of interests and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States. Id. § 1331(a).
137 Illinois is an example of those States which have adequate consumer class action
procedures. Hearings on S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Although Illinois has
no specific statutory provision for class actions, they are impliedly recognized by statute
JILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (Smith-Hurd 1968)] and by case law [Smyth v.
Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 IIl. 2d 27, 139 N.E.2d 796 (1956)]. Hearings on S. 3201,
supra note 111, at 431.
138 116 CONG. REcS 10,507-09, S10,514-22 (daily ed. July 1, 1970).
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW (Vol. 22: 11
able changes made before it is enacted, it would seem at this juncture
that the bill has a good chance for passage this year.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, it can be seen that the relationship between consumerism
and antitrust goes well beyond the traditional antitrust concepts
enunciated by Senator Hart,3 9 and evidenced by the consumer treble
damage actions which are pending.140  Consumer spokesmen who
believe that there has been a general breakdown in market compe-
tition, to the detriment of the consumer, are demanding means to
obtain the kinds of marketing which will allow for better product
choice. To some extent they may be obtaining greater relief from
the Federal Trade Commission. On the other hand, it seems clear
that this will not satisfy them, and we can expect more vigorous and
perhaps successful consumer activity in both federal and state legis-
latures.
139 See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
140 See notes 21-28 supra & accompanying text.
